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Abstract
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell its idle channel to a secondary.
Transmission rate of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary needs to select a price depending on the transmission
rate of its channel. Each secondary selects a channel depending on the price and the transmission rate of the channel.
We formulate the above problem as a non-cooperative game. We show that there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium
(NE) and explicitly compute it. Under the NE strategy profile a primary prices its channel to render the channel
which provides high transmission rate more preferable; this negates the perception that prices ought to be selected
to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their transmission rates.We show the loss of
revenue in the asymptotic limit due to the non co-operation of primaries. In the repeated version of the game, we
characterize a subgame perfect NE where a primary can attain a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff it would obtain
when primaries co-operate.
I. INTRODUCTION
To accommodate the ever increasing traffic in wireless spectrum, FCC has legalized the unlicensed access of
a part of the licensed spectrum band- which is known as secondary access. However, secondary access will only
proliferate when it is rendered profitable to license holders (primaries)1. We devise a framework to enable primaries
to decide price they would charge unlicensed users (secondaries). The price will depend on the transmission rate
which evolves randomly owing to usage of subscribers of primaries and fading. A secondary receives a payoff
from a channel depending on the transmission rate offered by the channel and the price quoted by the primary.
Secondaries buy those channels which give them the highest payoff, which leads to a competition among primaries.
Price selection in oligopolies has been extensively investigated in economics as a non co-operative Bertrand
Game [23] and its modifications [18], [26]. Price competition among wireless service providers have also been
explored to a great extent [3], [10], [12], [15], [16], [21], [22], [24], [25], [29], [31], [32], [34]–[36]. We divide
this genre of works in two parts: i) Papers which model price competition as Auction ( [29], [33]), and ii) Papers
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University Of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. Their E-mail
ids are arnob@seas.upenn.edu and swati@seas.upenn.edu.
Parts of this paper have been presented in ISIT’2013, Istanbul [7].
1Primaries are unlikely to encourage “free ride” where secondaries (unlicensed users) can access idle channel without paying for them. If
primaries are not compensated, they may therefore create artificial activity by transmitting some noise to deny secondaries.
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2which model the price competition as a non co-operative game ( [3], [10], [12], [15], [16], [19], [21], [22], [24],
[25], [31], [32], [34], [35]). We now distinguish our work with respect to these papers. As compared to the genre
of work in the first category our model is readily scalable and a central auctioneer is not required. Some papers in
the second category [3], [12], [16], [31], [34], [35] considered the quality of primaries as a factor while selecting
the price. But all of these papers mentioned above, ignore two important properties which distinguish spectrum
oligopoly from standard oligopolies: First, a primary selects a price knowing only the transmission rate of its own
channel; it is unaware of transmission rates offered by channels of its competitors. Thus, if a primary quotes a high
price, it will earn a large profit if it sells its channel, but may not be able to sell at all; on the other hand a low
price will enhance the probability of a sale but may also fetch lower profits in the event of a sale. Second, the same
spectrum band can be utilized simultaneously at geographically dispersed locations without interference; but the
same band can not be utilized simultaneously at interfering locations; this special feature, known as spatial reuse
adds another dimension in the strategic interaction as now a primary has to cull a set of non-interfering locations
which is denoted as an independent set; at which to offer its channel apart from selecting a price at every node of
that set. We have accommodated both of the above the uncertainty of competition in this paper. Building on the
results we obtain in this paper, we have accommodated both of the above characteristics in the sequel.
Some recent works ( [11], [13], [14], [17]) that consider uncertainty of competition and the impact of spatial
reuse ( [36] and [14]) assume that the commodity on sale can be in one of two states: available or otherwise. This
assumption does not capture different transmission rates offered by available channels. A primary may now need
to employ different pricing strategies and different independent set selection strategies for different transmission
rates, while in the former case a single pricing and independent set selection strategy will suffice as a price needs
not be quoted for an unavailable commodity. Our investigation seeks to contribute in this space.
We have studied the price competition in spectrum oligopoly in a sequel of two papers. Overall a primary has to
select an independent set and a pricing strategy in each location of the independent set. In this paper we focus only on
the pricing strategy of primaries by studying the game for only one location. The results that we have characterized
provide indispensable tools for studying the joint decision problem involving multiple locations. In the sequel to
this paper, we provide a framework for solving the joint decision problem building on the single location pricing
strategy. In addition, initially secondary market is likely to be introduced in geographically dispersed locations;
which are unlikely to interfere with each other, thus, the price competition in each location reduces to a single
location pricing problem which we solve in this paper. The reduced problem turns out to be of independent interest
as it exhibits certain desirable properties which no longer hold when there are multiple locations.
We formulate the price selection as a game in which each primary selects a price depending on the transmission
rate its channel provides. Since prices can take real values, the strategy space is uncountably infinite; which precludes
the guarantee of the existence of an Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy profile. Also standard algorithms for computing
an NE strategy profile do not exist unlike when the strategy space is finite.
First, we consider that primaries interact only once (Section III). We consider that the preference of the secondaries
can be captured by a penalty function which associates a penalty value to each channel that is available for sale
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3depending on its transmission rate and the price quoted. We show that for a large class of penalty functions, there
exists a unique NE strategy profile, which we explicitly compute (Section III-B). In the sequel to this paper, we
show that this is no longer the case when a primary owns a channel over multiple locations.
We show that the unique NE strategy profile is symmetric i.e. price selection strategy of all primaries are
statistically identical. Our analysis reveals that primaries select price in a manner such that the preference order
of transmission rates is retained. This negates the intuition that prices ought to be selected so as to render all
transmission rates equally preferable to a secondary. The analysis also reveals that the unique NE strategy profile
consists of ”nice” cumulative distributions in that they are continuous and strictly increasing; the former rules out
pure strategy NEs and the latter ensures that the support sets are contiguous.
Subsequently, utilizing the explicit computation algorithm for the symmetric NE strategies, we analytically
investigate the reduction in expected profit suffered under the unique symmetric NE pricing strategies as compared
to the maximum possible value allowing for collusion among primaries (Section IV).Finally, we extend our one
shot game at single location, to a repeated game where primaries interact with each other multiple number of times
(Section V) and compute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in which a primary attains a payoff which is
arbitrarily close to the payoff that a primary would have obtained if primaries were select price jointly; thus, price
competition does not lower payoff.
All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a spectrum market with l(l ≥ 2) primaries. Each primary owns a channel. Different channels leased
by primaries to secondaries constitute disjoint frequency bands. There are m secondaries. We initially consider the
case when primaries know m, later generalize our results for random, apriori unknown m (Section III-C). The
channel of a primary provides a certain transmission rate to a secondary who is granted access. Transmission rate
(i.e. Shanon Capacity) depends on 1) the number of subscribers of a primary that are using the channel2 and 2) the
propagation condition of the radio signal. The transmission rate evolves randomly over time owing to the random
fluctuations of the usage of subscribers of primaries and the propagation condition3. We assume that at every time
2Shanon Capacity [2] for user i at a channel is equal to log
(
1 +
pihi∑
j 6=i pjhj + σ2
)
where pk is the power with which user k is transmitting,
σ2 is the power of white noise, hk is the channel gain between transmitter and receiver which depends on the propagation condition. If a
secondary is using the channel then pi, hi of the numerator are the attributes associated with the secondary while pj , hjj 6= i are those of the
subscribers of the primaries. In general, the power pj for subscriber of primaries is constant for subscriber j of primary, but the number of
subscribers vary randomly over time. The power pi with which a secondary will transmit may be a constant or may decrease with the number
of subscribers of primaries in order to limit the interference caused to each subscriber. The above factors contributes to the random fluctuation
in the capacity of a channel offered to a secondary. In our setting pi, his are assumed to be the same across the secondaries for a channel which
we justify later. However, these values can be different for different channels.
3Referring to footnote 2, hk and σ2 evolve randomly owing to the random scattering of the particles in the ionosphere and troposphere; this
phenomenon is also known as fading.
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4slot, the channel of a primary belongs to one of the states 0, 1, . . . , n4. State i provides a lower transmission rate
to a secondary than state j if i < j and state 0 arises when the channel is not available for sale i.e. secondaries
can not use the channel when it is in state 05. A channel is in state i ≥ 1 w.p. qi > 0 and in state 0 w.p. 1 − q
where q =
∑n
i=1 qi, independent of the channel states of other primaries
6. Thus, the state of the channel of each
primary is independent and identically distributed. We do not make any assumption on the relationship between qi
and l or qi and m.7. We assume
q < 1. (1)
We assume that the transmission rate offered by the channel of a primary is the same to all secondaries. We justify
the above assumption in the following. We consider the setting where the secondaries are one of the following types:
i) Service provider who does not lease spectrum from the FCC and serves the end-users through secondary access,
ii) end-users who directly buy a channel from primaries. In initial stages of deployment of the secondary market,
secondaries will be of the first type. When the secondaries are of the first type, then a primary would not know
the transmission rate to the end-users who are subscribers of the service provider. A primary measures the channel
qualities across different positions in the locality (e.g. a cell) and considers the average as the channel quality
that an end-user subscribed to a secondary service provider will get at the location (e.g. a cell). This average will
be identical across different end-users subscribed to different secondary service providers and hence, the channel
quality is identical across the secondaries.
If the secondaries are of the second type, then the primary may know the transmission rate that an end-user
will attain which may be different at different positions. However, if a primary needs to select a price for each
position of the location, then it needs to compute the transmission rate at each possible position at that location
(e.g. a cell). Thus, the computation and storage requirement for the primary would be large. Such position based
pricing scheme will also not be attractive to the end-users since they may perceive it discriminatory as the price
changes when its position changes within a location (e.g. a cell). Thus, such a position based pricing scheme may
not be practically implementable. Hence, a primary estimates the channel quality and decides the price for the
estimated channel quality by considering that the channel quality will not significantly vary across the location.
This is because end-users who are interested to buy the channel from a primary at a location most likely have
4We discretize the available transmission rates into a fixed number of states n. This is a standard approximation to discretize the continuous
function [6], [20]. The corresponding inaccuracy becomes negligible with increase in n.
5Generally a minimum transmission rate is required to send data. State 0 indicates that the transmission rate is below that threshold due to
either the excessive usage of subscribers of primaries or the transmission condition.
6We have shown that at a given slot, the channel state differs across the primaries mainly because of the differences of i) the number of
subscribers that are using the channel and ii) the propagation conditions. Since different primaries have different subscriber bases, thus, their
usage behaviors are largely uncorrelated. Also, channels of different primaries operate on different frequency bands and have different noise
levels, thus, the propagation conditions are also uncorrelated across the channels.
7Since each primary sells its channel to only one secondary, thus, referring to footnotes 2 and 3 transmission rate (or qi) at a channel does
not depend on m (secondary demand) in practice.
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5similar propagation paths: for example, secondary users who buy the channels are most often present in buildings
(e.g. shopping complex, an office or residential area). The distance from the base station of the primary to the
end-users is also similar because the end-users are close to each other in a location. Thus, the path loss component
will also similar. Hence, the channel quality is considered to be identical across the secondaries.
Though the quality of a channel is identical for secondaries, the quality can vary across the channels. A primary
can get an estimate of the transmission rate by sending a pilot test signal at different positions with the location
and then, applying some standard estimation techniques [1].
A. Penalty functions of Secondaries and Strategy of Primaries
Each primary selects a price for its channel if it is available for sale. We formulate the decision problem of
primaries as a non-cooperative game. A primary selects a price with the knowledge of the state of its channel, but
without knowing the states of the other channels; a primary however knows l,m, n, q1, . . . , qn.
Secondaries are passive entities. They select channels depending on the price and the transmission rate a channel
offers. We assume that the preference of secondaries can be represented by a penalty function. If a primary selects
a price p at channel state i, then the channel incurs a penalty gi(p) for all secondaries. As the name suggests,
a secondary prefers a channel with a lower penalty. Since lower prices should induce lower penalty, thus, we
assume that each gi(·) is strictly increasing; therefore, gi(·) is invertible. A primary selects a price for its available
channel, but, since there is an one-to-one relation between the price and penalty at each state, we can equivalently
consider that primaries select penalties instead. For a given price, a channel of higher transmission rate must induce
lower penalty, thus, gi(p) < gj(p) if i > j. We can also consider that desirability of a channel for a secondary is
the negative of penalty. A secondary will not buy any channel whose desirability falls below a certain threshold,
equivalently, whose penalty exceeds a certain threshold. We consider that such threshold is the same for each
secondary and we denote it as v i.e. no secondary will buy any channel whose penalty exceeds v. Secondaries
have the same penalty function and the same upper bound for penalty value (v), thus, secondaries are statistically
identical.
Primary i chooses its penalty using an arbitrary probability distribution function (d.f.) ψi,j(·) 8 when its channel
is in state j ≥ 1. If j = 0 (i.e., the channel is unavailable), primary i chooses a penalty of v+ 1: this is equivalent
to considering that such a channel is not offered for sale as no secondary buys a channel whose penalty exceeds v.
Definition 1. A strategy of a primary i for state j ≥ 1, ψi,j(·) provides the penalty distribution it uses at each
node, when the channel state is j ≥ 1. Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,n) denotes the strategy of primary i, and (S1, ..., Sl)
denotes the strategy profile of all primaries (players). S−i denotes the strategy profile of primaries other than i.
8Probability distribution refers cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). C.d.f. of a random variable X is the function G(x), G(x) = P (X ≤
x) ∀x ∈ < [4].
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6B. Payoff of Primaries
We denote fi(·) as the inverse of gi(·). Thus, fi(x) denotes the price when the penalty is x at channel state i.
We assume that gi(·) is continuous, thus fi(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Also, fi(x) < fj(x) for each
x and i < j. Each primary incurs a transition cost c > 0 when the primary leases its channel to a secondary, and
therefore never selects a price lower than c.
If primary i selects a penalty x when its channel state is j, then its payoff is
fj(x)− c if the primary sells its channel0 otherwise.
Note that if Y is the number of channels offered for sale, for which the penalties are upper bounded by v, then those
with min(Y,m) lowest penalties are sold since secondaries select channels in the increasing order of penalties. The
ties among channels with identical penalties are broken randomly and symmetrically among the primaries.
Definition 2. ui,j(ψi,j , S−i) is the expected payoff when primary i’s channel is at state j and selects strategy
ψi,j(·) and other primaries use strategy S−i.
C. Nash Equilibrium
We use Nash Equilibrium (NE) as a solution concept which we define below
Definition 3. [23] A Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . , Sn) is a strategy profile such that no primary can improve its
expected profit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. So, with Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,n), (S1, . . . , Sn), is an NE if
for each primary i and channel state j
ui,j(ψi,j , S−i) ≥ ui,j(ψ˜i,j , S−i) ∀ ψ˜i,j . (2)
An NE (S1, . . . , Sn) is a symmetric NE if Si = Sj for all i, j.
An NE is asymmetric if Si 6= Sj for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Note that if m ≥ l, then primaries select the highest penalty v with probability 1. This is because, when m ≥ l,
then, the channel of a primary will always be sold. Henceforth, we will consider that m < l.
D. A Class of Penalty Functions
Since gi(·) is strictly increasing in p and gi(p) > gj(p) for i < j, we focus on penalty functions of the form
gi(p) = h1(p)−h2(i), where h1(·) and h2(·) are strictly increasing in their respective arguments. Note that −gi(p)
may be considered as a utility that a secondary would get at channel state i when the price is set at p. Such utility
functions are commonly assumed to be concave [30]; which is possible only if gi(·) is convex in p i.e. h1(·) is
convex. It is easy to show that when gi(p) = h1(p)− h2(i) and h1(·) is convex, satisfies the following property:
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7Assumption 1
fi(y)− c
fj(y)− c <
fi(x)− c
fj(x)− c for all x > y > gi(c), i < j. (3)
Moreover, when gi(p) = h1(p)/h2(i), then, the inequality in (3) is satisfied for some certain convex functions
h1(·) like h1(p) = pr(r ≥ 1), exp(p). In addition, there is also a large set of functions that satisfy (3), such as:
gi(p) = ζ (p− h2(i)) , gi(p) = ζ (p/h2(i)) where ζ(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, gi(·) are
such that the inverses are of the form fi(x) = h(x) + h2(i), fi(x) = h(x) ∗ h2(i), where h(·) is any strictly
increasing function, satisfy Assumption 1. Henceforth, we only consider penalty functions which satisfy (3).
We mostly consider gi(·)s which do not depend on l,m, n, q1, . . . , qn (e.g. Fig. 1, 2, 3). But in some case we
also consider that gi(·) is a function of n (e.g. Fig. 4).
III. ONE SHOT GAME: STRUCTURE, COMPUTATION, UNIQUENESS AND EXISTENCE OF NE
First, we identify key structural properties of a NE (should it exist). Next we show that the above properties
lead to a unique strategy profile which we explicitly compute - thus the symmetric NE is unique should it exist.
We finally prove that the strategy profile resulting from the structural properties above is indeed a NE thereby
establishing the existence.
A. Structure of an NE
We provide some important properties that any NE (S1, . . . , Sl) (where Si = {ψi,1, . . . , ψi,n}) must satisfy.
First, we show that each primary must use the same strategy profile (Theorem 1). In the sequel to this paper, we
show that this is no longer the case when there are multiple locations. In fact we show that there may be multiple
asymmetric NEs when there are multiple locations. We show that under the NE strategy profile a primary selects
lower values of the penalties when the channel quality is high (Theorem 3). We have also shown that ψi,j(·) are
continuous and contiguous (Theorem 2 and 4).
Theorem 1. Each primary must use the same strategy i.e. ψi,j(·) = ψk,j(·) ∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . , l} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Theorem 1 implies that an NE strategy profile can not be asymmetric. Since channel statistics are identical and
payoff functions are identical to each primary, thus this game is symmetric. Given that the game is symmetric,
apparently there should only be symmetric NE strategies. Although there are symmetric games where asymmetric
NEs do exist [5], we are able to rule that out in our setting using the assumptions that naturally arise in practice
namely those which are stated in Sections II.A. and II.B and Assumption 1 which is satisfied by a large class of
functions that are likely to arise in practice (Section II.E). Thus, a significance of Theorem 1 is that Theorem 1
holds for a large class of penalty functions which are likely to arise in practice. However, we show that there may
exist asymmetric NE in absence of Assumption 1 (Section VI-B).
Now, we point out another significance of the above theorem. In a symmetric game it is difficult to implement
an asymmetric NE. For example, for two players if (S1, S2) is an NE with S1 6= S2, then (S2, S1) is also an NE
due to the symmetry of the game. The realization of such an NE is only possible when one player knows whether
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8the other is using S1 or S2. But, coordination among players is infeasible apriori as the game is non co-operative.
Thus, Theorem 1 entails that we can avoid such complications in this game. We show that this game has a unique
symmetric NE through Lemma 2 and Theorem 5. Thus, Theorem 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 5 together entail that
there exists a unique NE strategy profile.
Since every primary uses the same strategy, thus, we drop the indices corresponding to primaries and represent
the strategy of any primary as S = (ψ1(·), ψ2(·), ....., ψn(·)), where ψi(·) denotes the strategy at channel
state i. Thus, we can represent a strategy profile in terms of only one primary.
Definition 4. φj(x) is the expected profit of a primary whose channel is in state j and selects a penalty x 9.
Theorem 2. ψi(.), i ∈ {1, .., n} is a continuous probability distribution. Function φj(·) is continuous.
The above theorem implies that ψi(·) does not have any jump at any penalty value. i.e. no penalty value is
chosen with positive probability. We now intuitively justify the property. There are uncountably infinite number of
penalty values and thus, clearly ψi(·) can only have jump at some of those values. Intuitively, there is no inherent
asymmetry amongst the penalty values within the interval (gi(c), v) i.e. at the penalty values except the end points
of the interval [gi(c), v]. Thus, a primary does not prioritize any of those penalty values. Now, we intuitively explain
why ψi(·) does not have jump at the end points. First, at penalty gi(c), a primary gets a payoff of 0 when the
channel state is i; but the payoff at any penalty value greater that gi(c) is positive, thus ψi(·) does not prioritize the
penalty value gi(c). On the other hand, intuitively if a primary selects penalty v with positive probability, then the
rest would select slightly lower penalty in order to enhance their sales and thus, the probability that the primary
would sell its channel decreases. Thus, ψi(·) also does not have a jump at v.
Note that in a deterministic N.E. strategy at channel state i, then ψi(·) must have a jump from 0 to 1 at the above
penalty value. Such ψi(·) is not continuous. Thus, the above theorem rules out any deterministic N.E. strategy.
The fact that φj(·) is continuous has an important technical consequence; this guarantees the existence of the best
response penalty in Definition 6 stated in Section III-B.
Definition 5. We denote the lower and upper endpoints of the support set10 of ψi(.) as Li and Ui respectively i.e.
Li = inf{x : ψi(x) > 0}.
Ui = inf{x : ψi(x) = 1}.
We next show that primaries select higher penalty when the transmission rate is low. More specifically, we show
that upper endpoint of the support set of ψi(·) is upper bounded by the lower endpoint of ψi−1(·).
Theorem 3. Ui ≤ Li−1, if j < i.
9Note that φj(x) depend on strategies of other primaries , to keep notational simplicity, we do not make it explicit
10The support set of a probability distribution is the smallest closed set such that the probability of its complement is 0. [4]
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9Fig. 1: Figure in the left hand side shows the d.f. ψi(·), i = 1, . . . , 3 as a function of penalty for an example setting:
v = 100, c = 1, l = 21,m = 10, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2 and gi(x) = x− i3. Note that support sets of ψi(·)s are disjoint
with L3 = 17.2766, U3 = 17.345 = L2, U2 = 22.864 = L1, and U1 = 100 = v. Figures in the center and the right hand side
show d.f. ψ2(·) and ψ3(·) respectively, using different scales compared to the left hand figure.
Theorem 3 is apparently counter intuitive. We prove it using the assumptions stated in Section II. In particular, we
rely on Assumption 1 which is satisfied by a large class of penalty functions (Section II-D). Thus, the significance
of Theorem 3 is that the counter intuitive structure holds for a large class of penalty functions. However, in
Section VI-C we show that Theorem 3 needs not to hold in absence of Assumption 1.
Fig. 1 illustrates Lis and Uis in an example scenario (The distribution ψi(·) in Fig. 1 is plotted using (9)).
In general, a continuous NE penalty selection distribution may not be contiguous i.e. support set may be a
union of multiple number of disjoint closed intervals. Thus, the support set of ψi(·) may be of the following form
[a1, b1] ∪ . . . ∪ [ad, bd] with bk < ak+1, k ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1}, a1 = Li and bd = Ui. In this case, ψi(·) is strictly
increasing in each of [ak, bk]k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, but it is constant in the “gap” between the intervals i.e. ψi(·) is constant
in the interval [ak−1, bk] k ∈ {2, . . . , d}. We rule out the above possibility in the following theorem i.e. the support
set of ψi(·) consists of only one closed interval [Li, Ui] which also establishes that ψi(·) is strictly increasing from
Li to Ui. In the following theorem we also rule out any “gap” between support sets for different ψi(·), i = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 4. The support set of ψi(·), i = 1, .., n is [Li, Ui] and Ui = Li−1 for i = 2, .., n, U1 = v.
Theorem 3 states that Li−1 ≥ Ui. Theorem 4 further confirms that Li−1 = Ui i.e. there is no “gap” between
the support sets. Theorem 4 also implies that there is no “gap” within a support set. We now explain the intuition
that leads to the reason. If there are a and b which are in the support sets such that the primaries do not select any
penalty in the interval (a, b), then, a primary can get strictly a higher payoff at any penalty in the interval (a, b)
compared to penalty at a or just below a. Thus, a primary would select penalties at or just below a with probability
0 which implies that a can not be in the support set of an NE strategy profile. We prove Theorem 4 using the above
insights and Theorem 3.
Figure 1 illustrates d.f. ψi(·) for an example scenario.
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B. Computation, Uniqueness and Existence
We now show that the structural properties of an NE identified in Theorems 1-4 are satisfied by a unique strategy
profile, which we explicitly compute (Lemma 2). This proves the uniqueness of a NE subject to the existence. We
show that the strategy profile is indeed an NE in Theorem 5. We start with the following definitions.
Definition 6. A best response penalty for a channel in state j ≥ 1 is x if and only if
φj(x) = sup
y∈<
φj(y). (4)
Let uj,max = φj(x) for a best response x11 for state j, j ≥ 1 i.e., uj,max is the maximum expected profit that a
primary earns when its channel is in state j, j ≥ 1.
Remark 1. In an NE strategy profile a primary only selects a best response penalty with a positive probability.
Thus, a primary selects x with positive probability at channel state i, then expected payoff to the primary must be
ui,max at x.
Definition 7. Let w(x) (wi, respectively) be the probability of at least m successes out of l − 1 independent
Bernoulli trials, each of which occurs with probability x (
∑n
k=i qk, respectively). Thus,
w(x) =
l−1∑
i=m
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−i−1. (5)
wi = w
 n∑
j=i
qj
 for i = 1, ..., n &wn+1 = 0. (6)
The following lemma provides the explicit expression for the maximum expected payoff that a primary can get
under an NE strategy profile.
Lemma 1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
ui,max = pi − c.
where, pi = c+ (fi(Li−1)− c)(1− wi). (7)
and Li = gi(
pi − c
1− wi+1 + c), L0 = v. (8)
Remark 2. Expected payoff obtained by a primary under an NE strategy profile at channel state i is given by
pi − c.
Remark 3. Starting from L0 = v, we obtain p1 (from (7)) and using p1 we obtain L1 by (8) which we use to
obtain p2 from (7). Thus, recursively we obtain pi and Li for i = 1, . . . , n.
11Since φj(·) is continuous by Theorem 2 and penalty must be selected within the interval [gj(c), v], thus the maximum exists in (4). This
maximum is equal to uj,max and φj(x) is equal to uj,max for some x.
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We now obtain expressions for ψi(·) using expression of Li and pi. We use the fact that w(·) is strictly increasing
and continuous in [0, 1].
Lemma 2. An NE strategy profile (if it exists) (ψ1(·), . . . , ψn(·)) must comprise of:
ψi(x) =0, if x < Li
1
qi
(w−1(
fi(x)− pi
fi(x)− c )−
n∑
j=i+1
qj), if Li−1 ≥ x ≥ Li
1, if x > Li−1. (9)
where pi, Li, i = 0, .., n are defined in (7).
Remark 4. Using (9) we can easily compute the strategy profile (ψ1(·), . . . , ψn(·)). Fig. 1 illustrates d.f. ψi(·) for
an example scenario.
The following lemma ensures that ψi(·) as defined in Lemma 2 is indeed a strategy profile.
Lemma 3. ψi(·) as defined in Lemma 2 is a strictly increasing and continuous probability distribution function.
Fig. 1 illustrates continuous and strictly increasing ψi(·) for i = 1, . . . , 3 for an example setting.
Explicit computation in Lemma 2 shows that the NE strategy profile is unique, if it exists. There is a plethora
of symmetric games [23] where NE strategy profile does not exist. However, we establish that any strategy profile
of the form (9) is an NE.
Theorem 5. Strategy profile as defined in Lemma 2 is an NE.
Hence, we have shown that
Theorem 6. The strategy profile, in which each primary randomizes over the penalties in the range [Li, Li−1]
using the continuous probability distribution function ψi(·) (defined in Lemma 2) when the channel state is i, is
the unique NE strategy profile.
C. Random Demand
Note that all our results readily generalize to allow for random number of secondaries (M) with probability mass
functions (p.m.f.) Pr(M = m) = γm. A primary does not have the exact realization of number of secondaries, but
it knows the p.m.f. . We only have to redefine w(x) as-
max(M)∑
k=0
γk
l−1∑
i=k
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−1−i
and wn+1 = γ0.
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Fig. 2: This figure illustrates the variation of pi − c, i =
1, . . . , n with m in an example setting: l = 51, n = 3, v =
100, c = 1, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2 and gi(x) = x2 − i3. For
m ≤ 5, pi − c ≈ 0 for all i. For 5 ≤ 5 ≤ 15, pi − c ≈ 0 for
i = 1, 2.. For 15 ≤ m ≤ 20, p1−c ≈ 0. When m exceeds 40,
pi− c, i = 1, 2, 3 closely match the highest possible expected
value as Lemma 4 indicates.
Fig. 3: Variation of efficiency (η) with m in an example
setting: gi(x) = x2 − i3, l = 51, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 =
0.2, v = 100 and c = 1. When m ≤ 5, η ≈ 0. When m ≥ 35,
η ≈ 1.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS OF NE STRATEGY PROFILE IN ASYMPTOTIC LIMIT
In this section, we analyze the reduction in payoff under NE strategy profile due to the competition. First, we
study the expected payoff that a primary obtains under the unique NE strategy profile in the asymptotic limit
(Lemma 4). Subsequently, we compare the expected payoff of primaries under the NE strategy profile with the
payoff that primaries get when they collude (Lemma 5). Subsequently, we investigate the asymptotic variation of
strategy profiles of primaries with n in an example setting (Fig. 4).
Recall from Remark 2 that expected payoff obtained by a primary under the unique NE strategy profile at channel
state i is given by pi − c. Next,
Definition 8. Let RNE denote the ex-ante expected profit of a primary at the Nash equilibrium. Then,
RNE =
n∑
i=1
(qi.(pi − c)). (10)
Note that l ·RNE denotes the total ex-ante expected payoff obtained by primaries at the NE strategy profile. We
obtain
Lemma 4. Let cj = gj(c), j = 1, .., n. When l→∞, then
pi − c→

fi(v)− c if (l − 1)
∑n
j=1 qj < m
fi(ck)− c if (l − 1)
∑n
j=k+1 qj < m
< (l − 1)∑nj=k qj 1 ≤ k < i
0 if m < (l − 1)∑nj=i qj .
We illustrate Lemma 4 using an example in Figure 2. Intuitively, competition increases with the decrease in
m. Primaries choose prices progressively closer to the lower limit c. Thus, the expected payoff pi − c, i = 1 . . . , n
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decreases as m decreases. The above lemma reveals that, as m becomes smaller only those primaries whose channels
provide higher transmission rate can have strictly positive payoff i.e. pi − c is positive (Fig. 2).
From Lemma 4 and (10) we readily obtain
Corollary 1. When l→∞, then,
RNE →

∑n
j=1 qj .(fj(v)− c) If (l − 1)
∑n
j=1 qj < m∑n
j=i+1 qj .(fj(ci)− c) If (l − 1)
∑n
j=i+1 qj < m
< (l − 1)∑nj=i qj
, i ∈ {1, .., n− 1}
0 If m < (l − 1)qn.
Thus, asymptotically RNE decreases as m decreases (Fig. 2).
Definition 9. Let ROPT be the maximum expected profit earned through collusive selection of prices by the
primaries. Efficiency η is defined as
l ·RNE
ROPT
.
Efficiency is a measure of the reduction in the expected profit owing to competition. The asymptotic behavior of
η is characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. When l→∞, then
η →
1 If (l − 1)
∑n
j=1 qj < m
0 If m < (l − 1)qn.
We illustrate the variation of efficiency with m using an example in Figure 3. Intuitively, the competition decreases
with increase in m; thus primaries set their penalties close to the highest possible value for all states. This leads to
high efficiency. On the other hand, competition becomes intense when m decreases, thus, RNE becomes very small
as Corollary 1 reveals. But, if primaries collude, primaries can maximize the aggregate payoff by offering only
the channels of highest possible states by selecting highest penalties. Thus, efficiency becomes very small when m
is very small (Fig. 3).
The transmission rates of an available channel constitute a continuum in practice. We have discretized the
transmission rates of an available channel in multiple states for the ease of analysis. However, the theory allows us
to investigate numerically how the penalty distribution strategies behave in the asymptotic limit (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4 reveals that Ln increases with n and eventually converges to a point which is strictly less than v. On the
other hand, L1 converges to v as n becomes large (Fig. 4). Thus, the lower endpoints (and thus, the upper endpoints
(since Uj = Lj−1)) of penalty selection strategies converge at different points when n becomes large.
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Fig. 4: Figure shows the plot of L1 and Ln with n. We consider v = 10, c = 0, l = 21,m = 10, q1 = . . . = qn = 0.5/n and
the following penalty function: gi(x) = x − (rmax − rmin) ∗ i/n, where rmax denotes the maximum possible transmission
rate which a secondary user can transmit and rmin denotes the minimum transmission rate required to transmit the signal. Note
that the penalty function is of the form gi(x) = h1(x) − h2(i), where, h1(x) = x is strictly increasing concave function in
x, and h2(i) = (rmax − rmin) ∗ i/n is strictly decreasing in i. Thus, gi(·) satisfies Assumption 1. We have equally divided
the available rate region into the number of states n. We consider that h2(·) is the representative rate at state i. We consider
rmax = 3.5 and rmin = 0.5.
V. REPEATED GAME
We have so far considered the setting where primaries and secondaries interact only once. In practice, however,
primaries and secondaries interact repeatedly. To analyze repeated interactions we consider a scenario where the
one shot game is repeated an infinite number of times. We characterize the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium
where the expected payoff of primaries can be made arbitrarily close to the payoff that primaries would obtain if
they would collude.
The one shot game is played at time slots t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,. Let, φi,t denote the expected payoff at stage t, when
the channel state is i. Hence, the payoff of a primary, when its channel state is i, is given by
φi = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtφi,t (11)
where, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Since NE constitutes a weak notion in repeated game [23], we will focus on Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE).
Definition 10. [23] Strategy profile (S1, . . . , Sn) constitutes a SPNE if the strategy profile prescribes an NE at
every subgame.
The one shot unique NE that we have characterized, is also a SPNE in repeated game. Total expected payoff
that a primary can get, is RNE (Definition 8) under one-shot game. We have already shown that this payoff is
not always efficient (Lemma 5) i.e. η 9 1. Here, we present an efficient SPNE (Theorem 7), provided that δ is
sufficiently high.
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Fix a sequence of {i}n1 such that
0 = 1 < 2 < . . . < n. (12)
i ≤ v − Li−1, i ≤ v − gi((fi(v)− c)(1− wi) + c). (13)
We provide a Nash Reversion Strategy such that a primary will get a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff that it
would obtain when all primaries collude.
Strategy Profile (SPR): Each primary selects penalty v − i, (where i satisfies (12) and (13)), when state of
the channel is i, at t = 0 and also at time slot τ = 1, 2, . . . as long as all other primaries have chosen v − j ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, when their channel state is j at all time slots 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1. Otherwise, play the unique one shot
game NE strategy ψi(·) (Lemma 2).
Remark 5. Note that if everyone sticks to the strategy, then each primary selects a penalty of v− i at every time
slot, when the channel state is i. Under the collusive setting, each primary selects penalty v. Thus, for every γ > 0,
we can choose sufficiently small i, i = 1, . . . , n and sufficiently high δ such that the efficiency (definition 9) is at
least 1− γ.
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 7. Suppose {i}ni=1 are such that they satisfy (12) and (13). Then, there exists δmin ∈ (0, 1) such that
for any discount factor δ ≥ δmin the strategy profile SPR is a SPNE.
Remark 6. Thus, there exists a SPNE strategy profile (for sufficiently high δ) where each primary obtains an
expected payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff it would have obtained if all primaries collude.
VI. PENDING QUESTION: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN ASSUMPTION 1 IS RELAXED?
We show that if penalty functions do not satisfy Assumption 1, then the system may have multiple NEs
(section VI-A), asymmetric NE (section VI-B) and the strategy profile that we have characterized in (9) may
not be an NE (section VI-C).
A. Multiple NEs
We first give a set of penalty functions which do not satisfy Assumption 1 and then we state a strategy profile
which is an NE for this set of penalties along with the strategy profile that we have characterized in (9).
Let fi(·) be such that
fi(x)− c
fj(x)− c =
fi(y)− c
fj(y)− c (x > y > gi(c), i < j) (14)
Examples of such kind of functions are gi(x) = (x− c)p/i.
It can be easily verified that strategy profile, described as in (9), is still an NE strategy profile under the above
setting. We will provide another NE strategy profile.
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First, we will introduce some notations which will be used throughout this section.
p¯i = (fi(v)− c)(1− w1) + c (15)
L¯ = g1(p¯1) (16)
Now, we show that there exists a symmetric NE strategy profile where a primary selects the same strategy for
its each state of the channel. This establishes that the the system has multiple NEs.
Let’s consider the following symmetric strategy profile where at channel state i a primary’s strategy profile is
ψ¯i(·) = ψ¯(·) for i = 1, . . . , n, where
ψ¯(x) =0 (if x < L¯)
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c ) (if v ≥ x ≥ L¯)
1 (if x > v) (17)
First, we show that ψ¯(·) is a probability d.f.
Lemma 6. ψ¯(·) as defined in (17) is a probability distribution function.
Note that in this strategy profile each primary selects the same strategy irrespective of the channel state. Next,
we show that strategy profile as described in (17) is an NE strategy profile.
Theorem 8. Consider the strategy profile where ψ¯i(·) = ψ¯(·), for i = 1, . . . , n. This strategy profile constitute an
NE.
B. Asymmetric NE
If Assumption 1 is not satisfied, then there may exist asymmetric NEs in contrast to the setting when Assumption
1 is satisfied. We again consider the penalty functions are of the type given in (14). We consider n = 2, l = 2,m = 1
and q1 = q2. Here, we denote ψi,j(·) as the strategy profile for primary i, i = 1, 2 at channel state j, j = 1, 2. Let
Lˆ = g2((f2(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)/(1− q2) + c) (18)
Note from (18) that
(f2(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2) = (f2(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)
(f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2) = (f1(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2) (from (14))
(f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q1) = (f1(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2) (since q1 = q2) (19)
Next
Lˆlow = g1((f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2) + c) (20)
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Again using (14) and the fact that q1 = q2 we also obtain
f2(Lˆlow)− c = (f2(Lˆ)− c)(1− q1) (21)
Consider the following strategy profile
ψ1,1(x) = 1, (x ≥ v),
=
1
q1
(1− q2 − (f2(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)
f2(x)− c ) (v > x > Lˆ)
= 0, x ≤ Lˆ
ψ1,2(x) = 1, (x ≥ Lˆ),
=
1
q2
(1− (f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2)
f1(x)− c ) (Lˆ > x > Lˆlow)
= 0, x ≤ Lˆlow (22)
and
ψ2,1(x) = 1, (x ≥ Lˆ),
=
1
q1
(1− (f2(Lˆ)− c)(1− q1)
f2(x)− c ) Lˆlow < x < Lˆ
= 0. x ≤ Lˆlow
ψ2,2(x) = 1, x ≥ v
=
1
q2
(1− q1 − (f1(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)
f1(x)− c ) Lˆ > x > v
= 0, x ≤ Lˆ (23)
It is easy to discern that the above strategy profile is a continuous distribution function. Also note that ψ1,1 6= ψ2,1
and ψ1,2 6= ψ2,2. Hence, the strategy profile is asymmetric. The following theorem confirms that the strategy profile
that we have just described is indeed an NE.
Theorem 9. The strategy profile ψ1 = {ψ1,1(·), ψ1,2(·)} and ψ2 = {ψ2,1(·), ψ2,2(·)} as described in (22) and (23)
respectively is an NE.
The above theorem confirms that there may exist an asymmetric NE when the penalty functions are of the form
(14).
C. Strategy Profile Described in (9) may not be an NE
We first describe a set of penalty functions that do not satisfy (3) and then we show that the strategy profile that
we have characterized in (9) is not an NE. 12
12Note that in theorem 5 we have shown that the strategy profile described in (9) is an NE when (3) is satisfied
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Consider that n = 2, c = 0; penalty functions are as follow:
g1(x) = x, f1(x) = x (24)
g2(x) = log(x), f2(x) = e
x (25)
Now, as c = 0, hence
f1(x)− c
f2(x)− c =
x
ex
= F (x)
dF (x)
dx
= e−x − xe−x (26)
From (26), it is clear that for x > 1, F (x) is strictly decreasing. Hence we have for 1 < x < y
f2(y)− c
f1(y)− c >
f2(x)− c
f1(x)− c (27)
which contradicts (3).
Now, let v = 5 and l = 20,m = 10, q1 = 0.2, q2 = 0.4. Under this setting, we obtain
Theorem 10. The strategy profile as defined in (9) is not an NE strategy profile.
Remark 7. Thus, the condition in (3) is also necessary for a NE strategy profile to be in the form (9).
In the example constructed above, however, an NE strategy profile may still exist. Now, we show that in certain
cases we can have a symmetric NE where L1 < L2. Thus, when channel state is 1 and 2, a primary chooses
penalty from the interval [L1, L2] and [L2, v] respectively. (Note the difference; in the strategy profile described in
lemma 2, we have L1 > L2). Consider the following symmetric strategy profile where each primary selects strategy
ψ˜i at channel state i, i ∈ {1, 2}-
ψ˜i(x) =0, if x < L˜i
1
qi
(w−1(
fi(x)− p˜i
fi(x)− c )−
i−1∑
j=1
qj), if L˜i+1 ≥ x ≥ L˜i
1, if x > L˜i+1 (28)
with L˜3 = v, L˜1 > 1.
and
p˜2 = (f2(v)− c)(1− w(q1 + q2))
L˜2 = g2(
p˜2
1− w(q1) )
L˜1 = g1(f1(L˜2)(1− w(q1))
p˜1 =
f1(L˜2)
f2(L˜2)
∗ p˜2 (29)
When v = 5, l = 20,m = 10, q1 = 0.2, q2 = 0.4; we obtain p˜2 = 27.6185, L˜2 = 3.3201, p˜1 = 3.3148, L˜1 = 3.3148
.
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It is easy to show that ψ˜i(·) as defined in (28) is distribution function with ψ˜i(L˜i) = 0 and ψ˜i(L˜i+1) = 1. Note that
under ψ˜i(·), a primary selects penalty from the interval [L˜1, L˜2] and [L˜2, v] when the channel states are 1 and 2
respectively. So, it remains to show that it is an NE strategy profile. The following theorem shows that it is indeed
an NE strategy profile.
Theorem 11. Strategy profile ψ˜i(·), i = 1, . . . , n as described in (28) is an NE .
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have analyzed a spectrum oligopoly market with primaries and secondaries where secondaries select a channel
depending on the price quoted by a primary and the transmission rate a channel offers. We have shown that in the
one-shot game there exists a unique NE strategy profile which we have explicitly computed. We have analyzed the
expected payoff under the NE strategy profile in the asymptotic limit and compared it with the payoff that primaries
would obtain when they collude. We have shown that under a repeated version of the game there exists a subgame
perfect NE strategy profile where each primary obtains a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff that it would have
obtained if all primaries collude.
The characterization of an NE strategy profile under the setting i) when secondaries have different penalty
functions and ii) when demand of secondaries vary depending on the pricing strategy remains an open problem.
The analytical tools and results that we have provided may provide the basis for developing a framework to solve
those problems.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of the results of Section III-A
We first state Lemma 7, 8 and 9 in order to prove Theorem 1. Theorem 2 readily follows from Lemma 7. After
that we show Corollary 3 which we use to prove theorems 3 and 4.
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Now, we introduce some notations which we use throughout this section.
Definition 11. Let ri(x) denote the probability of winning of primary i when it selects penalty x.
Let ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) denote the probability of at least m success out of l − 1 (except i) independent
Bernouli event with event k has success probability of xk.
Note that ri(x) does not depend on the state of the channel since secondaries select the channels based only on
the penalties. Since secondaries prefer channels which induce lower penalty thus ri(·) is non-increasing function.
Note that ti(·) is strictly increasing in each component. Note also that
ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) = w(x) (if x1 = . . . = xl = x). (30)
If primary i selects penalty x at channel state j, then its expected payoff is
(fj(x)− c)ri(x). (31)
Definition 12. A Best response penalty for primary i at channel state j ≥ 1 is
x = argmax
y∈<
(fj(y)− c)ri(y)
Let ui,j,max denote the maximum expected payoff under NE strategy profile for primary i at channel state j i.e.
ui,j,max is equal to the payoff at x at channel state j if x is a best response for primary i at channel state j.
A primary only selects penalty x with positive probability at channel state j, if x is a best penalty response at
j. We state an observation that we will use throughout:
Observation 1. Any penalty y ≤ gj(c) can not be a best response (definition 6) for channel state j.
Proof: Note that the profit of a primary is non-positive if the selected penalty is upper bounded by gj(c). On
the other hand when a primary selects penalty x where gj(c) < x ≤ v, it can sell its channel at least in the event
when the total number of available channels are less than m. Since 0 <
∑n
i=1 qi < 1 by (1), thus the event occurs
with non-zero probability, hence the profit is strictly positive when gj(c) < x ≤ v. Hence, the result follows.
We denote f(x−) = limy↑x f(y) throughout this section for a function f(·). Now we are ready to show Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. ψi,j(·) is continuous at all points, except possibly at v. Also, at most one primary can have a jump at
v.
Proof: Let ψi,j(·) has a jump at x < v where i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, x is a best response
for primary i at channel state j. Next, we show that no player other than player i will select penalty in the interval
[x, x+ ] with positive probability for small enough  > 0.
Fix a player k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , l} and channel state k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
First, note that if fk1(x) ≤ c, then a player can not select penalty in the interval [x, x + 0] with positive
probability where fk1(x + 0) − c < (fk1(v) − c)(1 − w(
∑n
j=1 qj)) since a primary gets a payoff of at least
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(fk1(v) − c)(1 − w(
∑n
j=1 qi)) at penalty v. Note that
∑n
j=1 qi < 1, thus 0 > 0. We need to consider states
k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that fk1(x) > c.
The payoff that player k will get at a channel state k1 at a y ∈ [x, x+ 1] is
(fk1(y)− c)rk(y) ≤ (fk1(y)− c)rk(x)
(since rk(y) ≤ rk(x)). (32)
For any δ > 0, expected payoff for player k at x− δ at channel state k1 is lower bounded by
(fk1(x− δ)− c)rk(x−)(since rk(x−) ≤ rk(x− δ)). (33)
Since ψi,j(·) has a jump at x, thus rk(x−) > rk(x). Hence, by continuity of fk1(·) there exists a δ > 0 and small
enough 1 > 0 such that for every y ∈ [x, x+ 1] we have
(fk1(x− δ)− c)rk(x−) > (fk1(y)− c)rk(x)
≥ (fk1(y)− c)rk(x) (from (32)).
Thus, player k has strictly higher payoff at x− δ compared to at penalty y ∈ [x, x+ 1].
Hence, no player apart from i selects penalty in the interval [x, x + ] with positive probability where  =
min(0, 1).
Since no player apart from player i select penalty in the interval [x, x + ], thus player i will have a strictly
higher payoff at x+  instead of x which contradicts the fact that x is a best penalty response for player i.
If player i selects v with positive probability, then player j, j 6= i will have strictly higher payoff by selecting a
penalty just below v. Hence, player j will select v with 0 probability. Hence, the result follows.
We introduce some notations which we use throughout this section:
Definition 13. Let Xm,i be the mth lowest penalty selected by primaries except i.
Note that if primary i selects penalty x, then it will not be able to sell its channel if Xm,i < x. Now we show
some results which directly follow from Lemma 7. We use these results to prove Theorem 1.
Observation 2. If ψk,j(·), k 6= i, j = 1, . . . , n does not have jump at x apart from i (i may or may not have jump
at x), then
ri(x) = 1− ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl)
(where xk =
n∑
j=1
qjψk,j(x)). (34)
Proof: Note that
ri(x) = P (A|Xm,i = x)P (Xm,i = x) + P (Xm,i > x) (35)
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where P (A|Xm,i = x) is the probability that primary i will be selected by secondaries when Xm,i = x. If
ψk,j(·), k 6= i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} does not have any jump at x, then,
P (Xm,i = x) = 0. (36)
On the other hand note that the probability of the event that primary k selects penalty less than or equal to x is
given by
∑n
j=1 qjψk,j(x), hence, P (Xm,i > x) is given by
1− ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) (37)
where xk =
∑n
j=1 qjψk,j(x). Thus, if ψk,j(·) does not have jump at x for all k and j, then (34) follows from (35),
(36) and (37).
By Lemma 7 no primary has a jump at x < v. Thus, ri(x) is exactly given by (34) when x < v. By Lemma 7,
only one player can have a jump at v. Thus, if player k have a jump at v, then by Observation 2, rk(v) = rk(v−).
Hence, the following corollary is a direct consequence of (34).
Corollary 2. ri(x) = rk(x) iff
∑n
j=1 qjψi,j(x) =
∑n
j=1 qjψk,j(x) and ri(x) > rk(x) iff
∑n
j=1 qjψi,j(x) >
qj
∑n
j=1 ψi,j(x) for x < v and for x = v if no primary has a jump at v. If primary k has a jump at v, then
rk(v) = rk(v−).
Definition 14. Let
Li,j = inf{x : ψi,j(x) > 0}. (38)
Ui,j = inf{x : ψi,j = 1}. (39)
Li,j , Ui,j are respectively the lowest and upper endpoint of support set of ψi,j(·).
Lemma 8. i ) Li,j is a best response for primary i at channel state j.
ii) Ui,j is a best response for primary i at channel state j, if one of the followings is true:
a) Ui,j < v.
b) Ui,j = v and no primary has a jump at Ui,j .
c) Ui,j = v and only primary i has a jump at v.
Proof: We prove part (i). The proof of part (ii) is similar and hence we omit.
We prove part (i) by considering the following two scenarios:
Case i: Li,j = v: Note that ψi,j(v) = 1. Thus, by (38), ψi,j(·) has a jump at Li,j ; thus, Li,j is a best response to
primary i at channel state j.
Case ii: Li,j < v: By Lemma 7, no primary has a jump at Li,j and thus ri(·) is continuous at Li,j . Thus, by (38),
primary i selects a penalty just above Li,j with positive probability when the channel state is j i.e. for every  > 0
there exists y ∈ (Li,j , Li,j + ) such that y is a best response to primary i at channel state j. Then, we must have a
sequence zk, k = 1, 2, . . . such that each zk is a best response for primary i at channel state j and lim
k→∞
zk = Li,j .
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But profit to primary i at channel state j is (fj(zk)− c)ri(zk). Now from continuity of fj(·) and ri(·) at Li,j we
obtain
lim
k→∞
(fj(zk)− c)ri(zk) = (fj(Li,j)− c)ri(Li,j). (40)
Since each zk, k = 1 . . . ,∞ is a best response, thus, Li,j is also a best response.
Lemma 9. Ui,a ≤ Li,j if a > j
Proof: Fix a primary i. We first show that for any x, y such that x < y ≤ v, if x is a best response when the
state of the channel is j, then y can not be a best response when the state of the channel is a where a > j. If not,
consider y > x such that x, y are the best responses when channel states are respectively j, a(a > j). Since x is a
best response at channel state j, thus fj(x) > c by Observation 1. On the other hand, since y is a best response at
channel state a, thus, fa(y) > c by Observation 1. Since y > x, thus fj(y) > c. Also,
ui,a,max = (fa(y)− c)ri(y). (41)
Expected payoff to primary i at channel state j at y is (fj(y)− c)ri(y). Thus, from (41)
ui,j,max ≥ (fj(y)− c)ri(y) = ui,a,max. fj(y)− c
fa(y)− c . (42)
Since x is a best response to primary i at channel state j, thus
ui,j,max = (fj(x)− c)ri(x).
Expected payoff of primary i at channel state a at penalty x is
(fa(x)− c)ri(x) = ui,j,max. fa(x)− c
fj(x)− c (43)
Using (42) and (43), we obtain-
(fa(x)− c)ri(x) ≥ ui,a,max. (fj(y)− c)(fa(x)− c)
(fa(y)− c)(fj(x)− c)
> ui,a,max(from (3)since y > x, a > j, fj(x) > c) (44)
which contradicts Definition 12.
We also obtain from the argument in the above paragraph, if Ui,a is a best response then Ui,a < Li,j .
If Ui,a is not a best response then by Lemma 8, Ui,a = v and there exists a primary other than i which has a
jump at v. Thus, by Lemma 7, primary i does not have a jump at v. Thus, ψi,a(·) is continuous and thus, by the
definition of Ui,a (39) for every  > 0, there exists y ∈ [v − , v) such that y is a best response for primary i at
channel state a. Hence, if Ui,a > Li,j , then there exists a y1 > Li,j such that y1 is a best response for primary i
for state a. But, we have already shown that it is not possible. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose the statement is not true. Thus, we must have i, k ∈ {1, . . . , l} which do not have
identical strategy. Let, j be the largest index in {1, . . . , n} such that ψi,j(·) and ψk,j(·) differs. Thus, we must have
x = inf{y ≤ v : ψi,j(y) 6= ψk,j(y)}.
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If x = v, then ψi,j(·) = ψk,j(·) since ψi,j(x′) = 1 for any x′ ≥ v. Hence, we must have x < v.
Note that by definition of j, ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) ∀a > j. Since x < v, thus ψi,j(x) and ψk,j(·) are continuous at
x by Lemma 7, thus, ψi,j(x) = ψk,j(x). Hence, ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) for all a ≥ j. By definition of x, ψi,j(·) and
ψk,j(·) can not differ at a penalty less than x and thus ψi,j(x) = ψk,j(x) 6= 1. Thus x < Ui,j and x < Uk,j , hence
ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) = 0 ∀a < j by Lemma 9. Since ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) for all a and qa, a = 1, . . . , n are exactly
the same for each primary, thus, by Corollary 2
ri(x) = rk(x). (45)
By definition of x, for every  > 0, there is a y such that y ∈ (x, x + ) and ψi,j(y) 6= ψk,j(y). Without loss of
generality, we assume that ψi,j(y) > ψk,j(y) for every y in (x, x+ ) for some  > 0. Thus, ψi,j(x+ ) > ψi,j(x)
for every  > 0. We consider the following two possible scenarios:
Case i: ψk,j(x+ ) > ψk,j(x) for every  > 0.
Hence, there is a γ > 0, such that x+ γ ≤ Uk,j , y ∈ (x, x+ γ) is a best response for primary k at channel state
j and ψi,j(y) > ψk,j(y). Since ψk,j(x+ ) > ψk,j(x) and ψi,j(x+ ) > ψi,j(x) for every  > 0; and no primary
has a jump at x, thus, x is also a best response for primary k and primary i at channel state j. But, expected payoff
to primary k at x at channel state j is
(fj(x)− c)rk(x) = (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (45)). (46)
Since x is a best response for primary i at channel state j, thus,
(fj(x)− c)ri(x) ≥ (fj(y)− c)ri(y). (47)
Since ψi,j(y) > ψk,j(y) and ψk,a(y) = ψk,a(x) (since Lk,j < y < Uk,j) by Lemma 9 for all a 6= j, thus,∑n
a=1 qaψi,a(y) >
∑n
a=1 qaψk,a(y). Thus, from Corollary 2 rk(y) < ri(y). Thus, expected payoff at y is
(fj(y)− c)rk(y) < (fj(y)− c)ri(y)
≤ (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (47))
= (fj(x)− c)rk(x) (from (46)). (48)
Since y and x are best response to primary k at channel state j, thus expected payoff to primary k at channel state
j at x and y must be equal. But, this leads to a contradiction from (48) and (46).
Case ii: ψk,j(x) = ψk,j(y) for some y > x:
Let x1 = inf{y > x : ψk,j(y) = ψk,j(x)}. Note that ψi,j(x1) > ψk,j(x1). We consider two possible scenarios:
Case ii a: x1 < v:
Since no primary has a jump at x1 by Lemma 7, thus, by definition of x1, it is a best response for primary k at
channel state j. But expected payoff to primary k at channel state j at x1 is given by
(fj(x1)− c)rk(x1). (49)
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Since ψk,j(x1) = ψk,j(x) < 1, thus, x1 < Uk,j , thus, ψk,a(x) = ψk,a(x1) ∀a < j by Lemma 9. Since ψi,j(x+) >
ψi,j(x) for every  > 0, thus, x ≥ Li,j , hence ψi,a(x) = 1 ∀a > j. Since x1 > x, thus, ψi,a(x1) = ψi,a(x) = 1
for all a > j. If ψk,a(x) < ψk,a(x1) ≤ 1 for some a > j, then ψi,a(·) differs from ψk,a(·) (since 1 = ψi,a(x) =
ψi,a(x1) for all a > j) at least at x, but this is against the definition of j. Hence, ψk,a(x) = ψk,a(x1) ∀a. Since
ψi,j(x1) > ψk,j(x1) and ψi,a(x1) ≥ ψi,a(x) for all a < j,thus,
∑n
a=1 qaψi,a(x) >
∑n
a=1 qaψk,a(x1). Thus, by
Corollary 2, ri(x1) > rk(x1). Since x is a best response for player i at channel state j, thus
(fj(x)− c)ri(x) ≥ (fj(x1)− c)ri(x1)(since x1 > x). (50)
Hence,
(fj(x)− c)rk(x) = (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (45))
≥ (fj(x1)− c)ri(x1) (from (50))
> (fj(x1)− c)rk(x1).
which contradicts the fact that x1 is a best response for player k when the channel state is j.
case ii b: x1 = v:
Since ψk,j(v) must be 1 and ψk,j(v−) = ψk,j(x) < 1. Hence, ψk,j(·) must have a jump at v and thus v is a best
response to primary k when the channel state is j. Thus, by Corollary 2, rk(v) = rk(v−). Thus, by the continuity
of fj(·), penalties close to v is also a best response for primary k at channel state j i.e.
(fj(v)− c)rk(v) = (fj(v−)− c)rk(v−). (51)
Since ψk,j(v−) = ψk,j(x) by the definition of x1, thus, similar to argument in case ii a, we obtain rk(y) < ri(y)
for x < y < v, i.e. there exists an  > 0, ri(v − ) > rk(v − ) but (fj(v) − c)rk(v) = (fj(v − ) − c)rk(v − )
(by (51)). Thus, there exists an  > 0, such that
(fj(v − )− c)rk(v) = (fj(v − )− c)rk(v − )
< (fj(v − )− c)ri(v − ). (52)
Note that the right hand side is the expression for the expected payoff of primary i at channel state j at penalty
v − . Since x is a best response to primary i at channel state j, thus,
(fj(x)− c)rk(x) < (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (45))
≥ (fj(v − )− c)ri(v − )
> (fj(v)− c)rk(v) (from (52))
which contradicts that v is a best response for primary k at channel state j. Hence, x1 6= v. Hence, this case
does not arise.
Thus from case i, case ii.a, and case ii.b we obtain the desired result.
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Henceforth, we denote ψi,j and ri(·) as ψj(·) and r(·) respectively by dropping the index corresponding to
primary i. Note from Definition 4 that
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)r(x). (53)
Also note that Li,j = Lj and Ui,j = Uj for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Since strategy profiles of primaries are identical,
thus, we can consider strategy profile in terms of only one primary (say, primary 1).
Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemma 7 ψi(·) does not have a jump at x < v. If a primary has a jump at v, then by
symmetric property other primaries also have a jump at v, which is not possible by Lemma 7 since l ≥ 2. Thus,
ψi(·) does not have a jump for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Now, we show that φj(·) is continuous. Now, we provide a closed form expression for φj(x) using (53). Since
ψi,j = ψj(x), thus, from Observation 2, (30) and Theorem 2 the expected payoff for primary i at x at channel
state j is given by
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=1
qjψk(x))).
The continuity follows from the equation due to the continuity of w(·) (Definition 7) and ψk, k = 1, . . . , n.
We obtain
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=1
qjψk(x))). (54)
Now, we show a corollary which is a direct consequence of Theorem 2. We use this result to prove Theorems 3
and 4.
Corollary 3. Every element in the support set of ψi(·) is a best response13; thus, so are Li, Ui.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a point z in the support set of ψi(·), which is not a best response. Therefore,
primary 1 plays at z with probability 0 when the channel state is i.
Now, one of the following two cases must arise.
Case I: ∃ a neighborhood [28] of radius δ > 0 around z, such that no point in this neighborhood is a best
response. Neighborhood of radius δ > 0 of z is an open set (Theorem 2.19 of [28]). Hence, we can eliminate that
neighborhood and can attain a smaller closed set, such that its complement has probability zero under ψi(·), which
contradicts the fact that z is in the support set of ψi(·).
Case II: For every  > 0, ∃y ∈ (z − , z + ), such that y is a best response. Then, we must have a sequence
zk, k = 1, 2, . . . such that each zk is a best response, and lim
k→∞
zk = z [28]. But profit to primary 1 for channel state
13Note that in general every element of a support set need not be a best response. To illustrate the fact consider a 3 player non co-operative
game and the following NE strategy profile: players 1 and 2 have identical strategy profile which is a uniform distribution from [L, v] and
player 3 selects v with probability 1. Since the support set is closed, thus v is in the support set for players 1 and 2. But, players 1 and 2 will
attain strictly higher payoff at just below v compared to at v. Thus, v is not a best penalty response for players 1 and2. We show that this
is not the case here because of the continuity of strategy profile. Specifically, a primary attains the highest possible expected payoff at every
penalty in the support set in our setting.
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i at each of zk is (fi(zk)− c)(1− w(
∑n
j=1 qjψj(zk))) by (54). Thus, we can show that z is also a best response
from the continuity of w(·) ad fj(·). We can conclude the result by noting that Ui, Li (Definition 5) are in the
support set of ψi(·).
Remark 8. By corollary 3, at any channel state i, a primary attains the same expected payoff (ui,max) at every
point in the support set.
Now we are ready to prove theorems 3 and 4.
Proof of Theorem 3: Theorem 3 is the direct consequence of Lemma 9 since Li,j = Lj and Ui,j = Uj ∀i.
Proof Of Theorem 4: Suppose the statement is not true. But, it follows that there exists an interval (x, y) ⊆ [Ln, v],
such that no primary offers penalty in the interval (x, y) with positive probability. So, we must have a˜ such that
a˜ = inf{b ≤ x : ψj(b) = ψj(x),∀j}.
By definition of a˜, a˜ is a best response for at least one state i. But, as no primary offers penalty in the range
(a˜, y), so from (54), φi(z) > φi(a˜) for each z ∈ (a˜, y). This is because w(
∑n
j=1 qjψj(z)) = w(
∑n
j=1 qjψj(a˜))
and fi(a˜) < fi(z). Thus, a˜ can not be a best response for state i.
B. Proof of Results of Section III-B
We prove Lemma 1, 2, 3. Then, we state and prove Observation 3 which we use to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Lemma 1: We first outline a recursive computation strategy that leads to the expressions in (7) and (8).
Using Theorem 4, we have U1 = v and thus v is a best response at channel state 1 (Corollary 3). If a primary
chooses penalty v then it sells only when Xm > v, this allows us to compute u1,max. By Theorem 4, primaries
with channel states 2, 3, . . . , n choose penalty below L1 and primaries with channel state 1 select penalty greater
than L1 with probability 1. This allows us to calculate the payoff at L1 which must be equal to u1,max. The above
equality allows us to compute the expression for L1.
Since L1 = U2 (Theorem 4) and U2 is a best response at channel state 2, which enables us to obtain the expression
for u2,max. By Theorem 4 primaries with channel states 3, . . . , n choose penalty below L2 and primaries with
channel state 1 and 2 select penalty greater than L2 with probability 1. This allows us to calculate the payoff at L2
which must be equal to u2,max. The above equality allows us to compute the expression for L2. Using recursion,
we can get the values of ui,max, Li, i = 1, . . . , n. The detailed argument follows:
We first prove (7) using induction, (8) follows from (7).
From theorem 4, ψi(·)’s support set is [Li, Li−1] for i = 2, ..., n and [L1, v] for i = 1. Thus, v is a best response
for channel state 1 (by Corollary 3), hence
u1,max = (f1(v)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=1
qi)) = p1 − c.
Thus, (7) holds for i = 1 with L0 = v. Let, (7) be true for i = t < n. We have to show that (7) is satisfied for
i = t+ 1 assuming that it is true for i = t. Thus,by induction hypothesis,
ut,max = pt − c = (ft(Lt−1)− c)(1− wt). (55)
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Now, Lt is a best response for state t, and thus,
φt(Lt) = (ft(Lt)− c)(1− wt+1) = pt − c.
Now, as Lt is also a best response for state t+ 1 by Corollary 3, thus
φt+1(Lt) = (ft+1(Lt)− c)(1− wt+1) = ut+1,max.
Thus, ut+1,max = pt+1 − c and it satisfies (7). Thus, (7) follows from mathematical induction.
(8) follows since (fi(Li)− c)(1− wi+1) = pi − c and gi(·) is the inverse of fi(·).
Proof of Lemma 2: By Theorem 4, Li, Li−1 are respectively the lower end-point and the upper end-point of the
support set of ψi(·). We should have for x < Li, ψi(x) = 0 and for x > Li−1,ψi(x) = 1. From Corollary 3, every
point x ∈ [Li, Li−1] is a best response for state i, and hence,
(fi(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
j=i+1
qj + qi.ψi(x))) = ui,max = pi − c.
Thus, the expression for ψi(·) follows. We conclude the proof by noting that the domain and range of w(.) is [0, 1],
and
pi − c
fi(x)− c < 1 for x ∈ [Li, Li−1]: so w
−1(.) is defined at 1− pi − c
fi(x)− c .
Proof of Lemma 3: Note that
ψi(Li) =
1
qi
(w−1(1− pi − c
fi(Li)− c )−
n∑
j=i+1
qj)
=
1
qi
(w−1(wi+1)−
n∑
j=i+1
qj) from(8)
= 0 (by(6)).
From (9) and (7), we obtain
ψi(Li−1) =
1
qi
(w−1(1− pi − c
fi(Li−1)− c )−
n∑
j=i+1
qj)
=
1
qi
(w−1(wi)−
n∑
j=i+1
qj)
=
1
qi
.qi = 1 (aswi = w(
n∑
j=i
qj)).
w(.) is continuous, strictly increasing on compact set [0,
∑n
j=1 qj ], so w
−1 is also continuous (theorem 4.17 in
[28]). Also,
pi − c
fi(x)− c is continuous for x ≥ Li as fi(x) > c, so ψi(.) is continuous as it is a composition of two
continuous functions. Again, w−1(.) is strictly increasing (as w(·) is strictly increasing), 1 − pi − c
fi(x)− c is strictly
increasing (as fi(·) is strictly increasing), so ψi(.) is strictly increasing on [Li, Li−1] ( as it is a composition of
two strictly increasing functions (Theorem 4.7 in [28])) .
Now, we state and prove a result (Observation 3). Subsequently we prove Theorem 5.
First, note that as 1− wi > 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, thus, pi − c > 0. Hence, from (8) it is evident that
fk(Lk) > c. (56)
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Observation 3. For t > s, t, s ∈ {1, . . . , n}
pt − c = (ps − c)
t−1∏
i=s
fi+1(Li)− c
fi(Li)− c . (57)
Proof: Since f−1i (·) = gi, thus from (8) we obtain for i− 1
pi−1 − c = (fi−1(Li−1)− c)(1− wi). (58)
Hence, from (7), (56), and (58)
pi − c = (pi−1 − c) fi(Li−1)− c
fi−1(Li−1)− c . (59)
We obtain the result using recursion.
Proof of Theorem 5: Fix a state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. First, we show that if a primary follows its strategy profile then
it would attain a payoff of pj − c at channel state j. Next, we will show that if a primary unilaterally deviates from
its strategy profile, then it would obtain a payoff of at most of pj − c (Case i and Case ii) when the channel state
is j.
If the state of the channel of primary 1 is i ≥ 1 and it selects penalty x, then its expected profit is-
φi(x) = (fi(x)− c)r(x)
= (fi(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=1
qk.ψk(x))). (60)
First, suppose x ∈ [Lj , Lj−1]. From (60) and (9), we obtain
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=1
qiψi(x)))
= (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=j+1
qk + qjψj(x)))
= (fj(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(1− pj − c
fj(x)− c ))) (from (9))
= pj − c. (61)
Since ψi(Ln) = 0 ∀i, we have
φj(Ln) = (fj(Ln)− c)(1− w(0)) = fj(Ln)− c. (62)
From (62) expected payoff to a primary at state j at Ln is fj(Ln)−c. At any y < Ln expected payoff to a primary at
state j will be strictly less than fj(Ln)− c. Hence, it suffices to show that for x ∈ [Lk, Lk−1], k 6= j, k ∈ {1, .., n},
profit to primary 1 is at most pj − c, when the channel state is j.
Now, let x ∈ [Lk, Lk−1]. From (60) and (9), expected payoff at x
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φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=k+1
qi + qkψk(x)))
= (fj(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(1− pk − c
fk(x)− c )))(from (9))
=
(pk − c)(fj(x)− c)
fk(x)− c . (63)
We will show that φj(x)− (pj − c) is non-positive. As, k 6= j, so only the following two cases are possible.
Case i: k < j: From (3), (56) and for i < j, we have-
fi(Li−1)− c
fi(Li)− c >
fj(Li−1)− c
fj(Li)− c (as Li < Li−1). (64)
From Observation 3 we obtain-
pj − c = (pk − c)(fj(Lj−1)− c)
fk(Lk)− c
j−1∏
i=k+1
fi(Li−1)− c
fi(Li)− c .
Using (64) the above expression becomes
pj − c ≥ (pk − c)(fj(Lj−1)− c)
fk(Lk)− c
j−1∏
i=k+1
fj(Li−1)− c
fj(Li)− c
=
(pk − c)(fj(Lk)− c)
fk(Lk)− c . (65)
Hence, from (63) and (65), we obtain-
φj(x)− (pj − c)
≤ (pk − c)( fj(x)− c
fk(x)− c −
fj(Lk)− c
fk(Lk)− c ). (66)
Since x ∈ [Lk, Lk−1], j > k and fk(Lk) > c (by (56)); hence, from (66) and Assumption 1, we have-
φj(x) ≤ pj − c. (67)
Case ii: j < k: If fj(x) ≤ c then a primary gets a non-positive payoff at channel state j, which is strictly below
pj − c. Hence we consider the case when fj(x) > c. Since x ≤ Lk−1 thus fj(Lk−1) > c. Now, if i > j and
fj(Li) > c, we have from (3) and (56)-
fi(Li−1)− c
fj(Li−1)− c <
fi(Li)− c
fj(Li)− c (as Li < Li−1) (68)
Since fj(Lk−1) > c, thus
fj(Li) > c (for j ≤ i < k, as Li ≥ Lk−1). (69)
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Now, from Observation 3 we obtain-
pk − c = (pj − c)
k−1∏
i=j
fi+1(Li)− c
fi(Li)− c
= (pj − c). fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lj)− c
k−1∏
i=j+1
fi(Li−1)− c
fi(Li)− c
≤ (pj − c). fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lj)− c
k−1∏
i=j+1
fj(Li−1)− c
fj(Li)− c
(from (68),&(69))
= (pj − c). fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lk−1)− c . (70)
Thus, from (63) and (70), we obtain-
φj(x)− (pj − c)
≤ (pj − c)(fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lk−1)− c .
fj(x)− c
fk(x)− c − 1)
≤ 0(as x ≤ Lk−1, j < k and from Assumption 1). (71)
Hence, from (71), (67), and (61), every x ∈ [Lj , Lj−1] is a best response to primary 1 when channel state is j.
Since j is arbitrary, it is true for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and thus (9) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium strategy profile.
C. Proof of results of Section IV
We first establish Lemma 4. Subsequently, we prove Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 4: We divide the proof in three parts:
• First, we prove that when m ≥ (l− 1)(∑nj=1 qj + ) for some  > 0, then pi− c→ fi(v)− c as l→∞ (Part
I).
• Next we show that if (l−1)∑nj=k(qj+) ≥ m ≥ (l−1)∑nj=k+1(qj−) for some  > 0, then pi−c→ fi(ck)−c
if i > k and pi − c→ 0 if i ≤ k (Part II).
• Finally, we show if m ≤ (l − 1)(qn + ) for some  > 0, then pi − c → 0 as l → ∞ for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(Part III).
Part I: Suppose m ≥ (l − 1)(∑nj=1 qj + ) for some  > 0.
Since Li−1 ≤ v, thus, from (7)-
pi − c ≤ (fi(v)− c) i = 1, . . . , n. (72)
When primary 1 selects penalty v at channel state i ≥ 1, then its expected profit is φi(v) = (fi(v)− c)(1− w1).
Now, from Theorem 6 under the NE strategy profile,
pi − c ≥ φi(v) = (fi(v)− c)(1− w1). (73)
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Let Zi, i = 1, .., l − 1 be Bernoulli trials with success probabilities
∑n
j=1 qi and Z =
∑l−1
i=1 Zi; so P (Z ≥ m) is
equal to w1 by (6). Since m ≥ (l− 1)(
∑n
i=1 qi + ) for some  > 0 and E(Z) = (l− 1)
∑n
i=1 qi, by weak law of
large numbers [27], w1 → 0 as l → ∞. Hence, pi − c → fi(v) − c as l → ∞ by (72) and (73).Thus, the result
follows. .
Part II: We show the result by evaluating the expressions for pj−c, j = 1, . . . , n in the asymptotic limit. Towards
this end, we first evaluate the expressions for wj and Lj in the asymptotic limit. We obtain the expression for pj−c
when we combine those two values.
Suppose (l− 1)∑nj=k(qj + ) ≥ m ≥ (l− 1)∑nj=k+1(qj − ) for some  > 0. Since wk+1 is the probability of at
least m successes out of l − 1 independent Bernoulli trials, each of which occurs with probability ∑nj=k+1 qj (by
(6)). Hence from the weak law of large numbers [27]
1− wk+1 → 1 as l→∞. (74)
Since wj < wi, for any j > i (from (6)), we have from (74) for j ≥ k + 1
1− wj → 1 as l→∞. (75)
Again, as m ≤ (l − 1)(∑nj=k qj − ), so, from weak law of large numbers [27], for every  > 0, ∃L, such that
1− wk < , whenever l ≥ L. Hence,
1− wk →
l→∞
0
1− wj →
l→∞
0 (for j ≤ k,wj ≥ wk). (76)
Thus, it is evident from (7) and (76) that if i ≤ k, then
pi − c →
l→∞
0. (77)
Thus, from (8), (75), and (77)
Lk →
l→∞
gk(c) = ck. (78)
We obtain for j > k from (7) and (75)
pj →
l→∞
fj(Lj−1). (from (75)). (79)
Again, using (8) and (75), we obtain for j > k
pj →
l→∞
fj(Lj) (from (75)). (80)
fj(·) is strictly increasing, thus from (79) and (80), Lj → Lj−1 (for j > k). Hence, for j > k,
Lj →
l→∞
Lk
Lj →
l→∞
ck (from(78)). (81)
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Thus, from (81), and (80), we obtain for any i > k
pi − c →
l→∞
(fi(ck)− c). (82)
Thus, from (77) pi − c → 0 as l → ∞ if i ≤ k. From (82) we obtain pi − c → fi(ck) − c as l → ∞ if i > k.
Hence, the result follows.
Part III: Suppose that m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ), for some  > 0. Let, Zi, i = 1, ..., l − 1 be the Bernoulli trials with
success probabilities qn and Z =
∑l−1
i=1 Zi, E(Z) = (l − 1)qn. Hence,
1− wn ≤ P (Z ≤ m)
≤ P (Z ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ))
≤ P (|Z − (l − 1)qn| ≥ (l − 1))
≤ 2 exp(−2(l − 1)
22
l − 1 )
(from Hoeffding’s Inequality [9])
= 2 exp(−2(l − 1)2). (83)
Note that 1− wi < 1− wj (if j > i), fk(Lk−1) > fk−1(Lk−1). Hence, it can be readily seen from (7) that
pi − c ≤ (fi(Li−1)− c)(1− wn). (84)
Thus, the result follows from (83) and (84).
When m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ) for some  > 0, then the upper bound for RNE (see (10)) from (84)is
RNE ≤ (1− wn)(
n∑
j=1
qj .(fj(Lj−1)− c)). (85)
Thus, for m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ),  > 0, from (83) and (85), we obtain.
RNE ≤ γ · exp(−22.(l − 1)) (86)
where γ = 2(1− wn)(
∑n
j=1 qj .(fj(Lj−1)− c)). We will use this bound in proving Lemma 5.
From, the definition of η, it should be clear that
η ≤ 1. (87)
Now, we show Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 5: We divide the proof in the following two parts
• First, we show that if m ≥ (l − 1)(∑ni=1 qi + ) for some  > 0, then η → 1 as l→∞ (Part I).
• Next, we show that if m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ), for some  > 0, then η → 0 as l→∞ (Part II).
Part I: First suppose that m ≥ (l − 1)(∑ni=1 qi + ) for some  > 0.
From, definition of ROPT , it is obvious that
ROPT ≤ l · (
n∑
i=1
(qi.(fi(v)− c))). (88)
Hence the result follows from Corollary 1, (88) and (87).
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Part II: Now, suppose that m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ), for some  > 0. We prove that η → 0 as l→ 0.
We prove the result by showing that RNE decreases at fast rate to 0 compared to ROPT when l→∞.
Let, Z be the number of primaries, whose channel is in state n. Hence,
ROPT ≥ E(min(Z,m))(fn(v)− c)
ROPT
fn(v)− c ≥ E(min(Z,m)). (89)
Note that E(Z) = l · qn, V ar(Z) = l · qn(1− qn).
We introduce a new random variable Y as follows-
Y =
m, ifZ ≥ m0, otherwise.
So,
E(min(Z,m)) ≥ E(Y )
= m.P (Z ≥ m)
≥ m.(1− P (Z ≤ (l − 1)(qn − )))
≥ m.(1− P (|Z − l.qn| ≥ (l − 1))
≥ m.(1− l.qn.(1− qn)
(l − 1)2.2 )
(From Chebyshev’s Inequality). (90)
Hence, from (86), (89) and (90), we obtain-
η ≤ l.γ. exp(−2(l − 1)
2)
m.(1− l.qn.(1− qn)
(l − 1)2.2 ).(fn(v)− c)
.
Thus, η tends to zero for m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ),as l tends to infinity (as m 6= 0).
D. Proof of Results of Section VI
First, we prove Lemma 6. Subsequently, we state and prove Observation 4 which we use to show Theorem 8.
The proof of Theorem 9 is similar and hence we omit it. Finally, we show Theorems 10 and 11.
Proof of Lemma 6: First , it is evident from (15) and (16)
0 ≤ p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c (ifx ≥ L¯)
Hence, w−1(·) is defined at x ≥ L¯. Note that
ψ¯(L¯) =
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(g1(p¯1))− c ) (from(16))
= 0
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Note that
ψ¯(v) =
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(v)− c )
=
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− (f1(v)− c)(1− w1)
f1(v)− c )
=
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(w1)
= 1
We already know that w−1(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Since 1− p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c is strictly increasing and
continuous for x ≥ L¯. Hence, ψ¯(·) is continuous and strictly increasing on [L¯, v]. .
Observation 4.
fi(L¯) = p¯i (i = 1, . . . , n) (91)
Proof: The result is trivially true for i = 1 by definition (16) as g1(·) = f−11 (·). We will show the statement
for i ≥ 2. Since fi(L¯) > f1(L¯) > c, we have from (14)
f1(L¯)− c
fi(L¯)− c =
f1(v)− c
fi(v)− c
p¯1 − c
fi(L¯)− c =
f1(v)− c
fi(v)− c
(f1(v)− c)(1− w1)
fi(L¯)− c =
f1(v)− c
fi(v)− c (from(15))
fi(L¯)− c = p¯i − c (from(15))
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 8: We show that for any x ∈ [L¯, v], a primary attains a payoff of p¯i − c at channel state i.
Then, we will show that if a primary selects a penalty outside the interval a primary’s payoff is strictly less than
p¯i − c at channel state i.
Suppose, x ∈ [L¯, v]. Now, fix any channel state i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If primary 1 selects penalty x at channels state
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i, then its expected payoff is
φi(x) = (fi(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
j=1
qjψ¯j(x)))
= (fi(x)− c)(1− w(ψ¯(x)
n∑
j=1
qj))
= (fi(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c )))
=
(p¯1 − c)(fi(x)− c)
f1(x)− c
=
(f1(v)− c)(fi(x)− c)(1− w1)
f1(x)− c
(Using(15), f1(L¯) > c)
= (fi(v)− c)(1− w1) (using(14))
= p¯i − c (from(15)) (92)
Now, at any x < L¯, expected payoff will be strictly less than fi(L¯)−c. But, from Observation 4, fi(L¯)−c = p¯i−c.
Thus, from (92), when channel state is i ≥ 1, every point in the interval [L¯, v] is a best response to primary 1.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 10: By simple calculation, we obtain the following values
p1 = 0.9305, L1 = 1.1432, L2 = 0.9372
Now, consider the following unilateral deviation for primary 1: primary 1 will choose a penalty x ∈ (0.9305, 0.9372)
with probability 1, when the channel state is 1. Since, no primary selects penalty lower than 0.9372 under the strategy
profile (9), thus expected payoff that primary 1 will obtain is f1(x)− c = x− c, which is strictly larger than p1− c
(since x > 0.9305 = p1), the expected payoff that primary 1 gets by Theorem 6 when it selects strategy according
to (9). Thus, the strategy profile as defined in (9) is not an NE.
Proof of Theorem 11: We show that when the channel state is i = 2 a primary does not have any profitable
unilateral deviation from the strategy profile. The proof for i = 1 is similar and thus we omit it.
First, we show that under the strategy profile a primary attains a payoff of p˜2 − c at channel state i = 2. Next, we
show that if a primary deviates at channel state 2, then its expected payoff is upper bounded by p˜2 − c.
Note that when channel state is 2 and primary chooses penalty x ∈ [L˜2, v], expected payoff to primary 1 is-
(f2(x)− c)(1− w(
2∑
i=1
qi ∗ ψ˜i(x)))
= (f2(x)− c)(1− w((w−1(f2(x)− p˜2
f2(x)− c ) + q1 − q1)))
= p˜2 − c (93)
Now, suppose x ∈ [L˜1, L˜2]. From (93), expected payoff to a primary when it selects penalty x at channel state 2,
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is-
(f2(x)− c)(1− w(q1 ∗ ψ˜1(x)))
= (f2(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(f1(x)− p˜1
f1(x)− c )))
= (f2(x)− c) p˜1 − c
f1(x)− c
=
(f2(x)− c)(f1(L˜2)− c)
(f1(x)− c)(f2(L˜2)− c)
∗ (p˜2 − c)
(from (29) and c = 0)
< p˜2 − c (from (27) asL˜2 ≥ x ≥ L˜1 > 1) (94)
Note that at L˜1, ψ˜i(x) = 0, i = 1, 2. Hence, the expected payoff to a primary when it selects penalty L˜1 at channel
state 2 is given by f2(L˜1)− c. From (94) we obtain p˜2 > f2(L˜1), hence any penalty x < L˜1 will induce payoff of
strictly lower than p˜2 when channel state is 2. Hence, the result follows.
E. Proof of Results of Section V
Here, we prove Theorem 7. Towards this end, we state and prove Observation 5.
First, we evaluate the total expected payoff that a primary will get under the strategy profile (SPR). Note that the
strategy SPR is symmetric, thus, the expected payoff of primaries would be identical and thus, we only evaluate
the expected payoff of primary 1.
Now we introduce some notations which we use throughout this section:
Definition 15. Let Xm be the mth smallest offered penalty offered by primaries i = 2, . . . , l.
Let, Ai denote the event that at a time slot, primary 1’s channel will be bought, when its channel state is i and
selects penalty v− i and primary 2, . . . , l selects penalty v− j , when its channel state is j, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let’s
recall the definition of Xm (definition 15). From the law of total probability,
Pr(Ai) = Pr(Ai|Xm > v − i) Pr(Xm > v − i)
+ Pr(Ai|Xm = v − i) Pr(Xm = v − i)
+ Pr(Ai|Xm < v − i) Pr(Xm < v − i) (95)
Now, note that Pr(Ai|Xm) = 1 if Xm > v − i and Pr(Ai|Xm) = 0 if Xm < v − i.
Note from (12) that
Pr(Xm > v − i) =
m−1∑
j=0
(
l − 1
j
)
(
n∑
k=i
qk)
j(1−
n∑
k=i
qk)
l−1−j
= 1− wi (96)
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Thus, the first term of right hand side (r.h.s.) of(95) is 1−wi. We will denote the second term of the r.h.s. of (95)
as βi. Since the third term of the r.h.s. of (95) is zero, hence,
Pr(Ai) = 1− wi + βi (97)
Thus, if primary follows the strategy profile as described, then its total expected payoff at any stage of the game
will be
RSNE =
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j))(1− wj + βj) (98)
Next observation will be used in proving Theorem 7.
Observation 5. If a primary selects a penalty which is strictly greater than v− i, then the probability of winning
is ≤ 1− wi.
Proof: Consider that a primary selects penalty x > v − i. Note that only if Xm ≥ x, then the channel of the
primary may be bought14. Hence,
Pr(the channel of the primary is bought) ≤ Pr(Xm ≥ x) (99)
Since, x > v − i, thus
Pr(Xm > v − i) = Pr(Xm ≥ x) + Pr(x > Xm > v − i)
=> Pr(Xm > v − i) ≥ Pr(Xm ≥ x) (100)
Hence, using (100) in (99), we obtain
Pr(the channel of the primary is bought) ≤ Pr(Xm > v − i) (101)
But from (96), 1− wi = Pr(Xm > v − i), hence the result follows from (101).
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 7.
proof of Theorem 7: Fix any state i. We prove the theorem in two part. In Part 1, we show that when the game
is at a stage where other primaries select penalty v − j , j = 1, . . . , n at channel state j, then primary 1 does not
have any unilateral deviation by selecting penalty different from v − i for sufficiently high δ. In part 2, we show
that if the game is in a stage where all the other primaries play the unique NE strategy profile, then primary 1 also
does not have any profitable unilateral deviation. This will ensure that SPR is a subgame perfect NE.
Proof of Part 1: First, we show that, deviating to lower penalty compared to v − i is not profitable (case 1) and
then we show that deviating to a higher penalty compared to v − i, is also not profitable (case 2) when other
primaries select penalty v − j , j = 1, . . . , n at channel state j.
Case 1: First, suppose that primary 1 offers penalty, which is strictly less than v − i.
14when Xm = x then there is a nonzero probability that the channel may not be bought
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A primary can attain at most a payoff of fi(v − i) at this stage. After this deviation, all the primaries play the
unique N.E. strategy. The payoff is given by RNE . Now,
RNE =
n∑
j=1
qj(pj − c)
=
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(Lj−1)− c)(1− wj) (from (7))
≤
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj) (from(13)) (102)
If a primary deviates at stage T , then its expected payoff starting from stage T would be at most
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v − i)− c) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δRNE ] (103)
If a primary would not have deviated, then its expected payoff would have been
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRSNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (104)
Hence, from (103) and (104), the following condition must be satisfied for sub game perfect equilibrium
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δRNE ] ≤
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (105)
From (98) and (102), it is enough to satisfy the following inequality in order to satisfy inequality (105)
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj) ≤
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi)
+ δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj + βj) (106)
By simple algebraic manipulation in (106), we obtain
δ ≥ (fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi)
(fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi) +
∑n
j=1 qj(fj(v − j)− c)βj
(107)
The proof is complete by observing that the right hand side of (107) is strictly less than 1. Hence, if δ is greater
than the following expression
max
i∈1,...,n
(fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi)
(fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi) +
∑n
j=1 qj(fj(v − j)− c)βj
then, a primary will not have any profitable one shot deviation.
Case 2: Now, suppose that primary 1 offers penalty which is strictly greater than v − i.
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Since primary 1 offers penalty strictly greater than v − i and v − i ≤ v, thus, from observation 5, primary 1
can at most attain a payoff of (fi(v)− c)(1−wi) by offering penalty higher than v− i. After the deviation, all the
primaries play the one-shot NE strategy profile. If a primary deviates at stage T , then its expected payoff starting
from stage T would be
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v)− c)(1− wi) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δRNE ] (108)
If a primary would not have deviated, then its expected payoff would be
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRSNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (109)
Hence, from (108) and (109), the following condition must be satisfied for sub game perfect equilibrium
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v)− c)(1− wi) + δRNE ] ≤
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (110)
Hence, from (98) satisfying the following condition will be enough for the strategy profile to be a SPNE.
(1− δ)(fi(v)− c)(1− wi) + δRNE
≤ (1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi)
+ δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj + βj) (111)
But, from (13)
(fi(v)− c)(1− wi) ≤ (fi(v − i)− c)
Hence, it is enough to satisfy the following inequality in order to satisfy inequality (111)
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj) ≤
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi)
+ δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj + βj) (112)
which is exactly similar to (106). Hence, the rest of the proof will be similar to case 1.
proof of part 2: If other primaries play the unique one-shot NE strategy, selecting the unique one-shot NE strategy
is a best response for a primary. Hence, no primary has any profitable unilateral deviation.
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